Huub Brouwer and I have recently published an edited volume of essays in normative ethics written by Shelly Kagan.

The essays are grouped in three parts. Part I contains a cluster of essays on the structure of normative ethics. These essays provide a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, introduce the concept of evaluative focal points, and examine competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics. The essays in Part II explore the various methods of normative ethics, critically examining the role of thought experiments and the practical difficulty of following moral principles given various epistemic limitations. Part III brings together two essays relating to practical ethics, in particular on whether consequentialist theories can adequately deal with collective action problems, and on whether speciesism is morally wrong. The volume also contains a preface by Kagan, an introduction co-written by the two editors, and a commentary by the two editors that identifies interrelations between Kagans published works and points to criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers.

Huub Brouwer and I will soon publish the second volume of essays in value theory written by Shelly Kagan.

The essays are grouped into three parts. Part I contains work on the nature of intrinsic value in which Kagan argues that an object’s intrinsic value may sometimes depend on its instrumental value. The essays in Part II explore the nature of well-being. Essays in this part consider to what extent the limits of well-being extend beyond the realm of the individual person. These essays raise a number of issues that cast doubt on the traditional “tripartite” division of theories of well-being, and whether the question of how well-off an individual is should be treated separately to the question of how well their life is going. Subsequent essays investigate a “hybrid” theory of well-being that combines elements from hedonism and objective list theories, and two essays raise the important but neglected question: What is the opposite of well-being? Part III brings together essays on desert. These essays introduce a graphical analysis of desert claims, offer a new theory of comparative desert – arguing that equality derives its moral significance from desert – and examine whether desert-sensitive moral theories involve an infinite regress; a later essay explores the nature of the duty to give people what they deserve. The volume contains an introduction co-written by the two editors and a preface by Kagan, as well as a commentary by the two editors identifying connections between Kagan’s published works and points to criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers.